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Recent Decisions
PATENTS - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - PATENTABILITY OF LIVING
MICROORGANISMS -The United States Supreme Court has held that a
live, human-made, genetically engineered microorganism is patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
In 1972, Ananda M. Chakrabarty filed a patent application' asserting
thirty-six claims 2 related to his invention of human-made, genetically
engineered bacteria3 that can break down crude-oil spills on water." An
examiner in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) allowed three
claims for the method of production of the bacteria,' and five claims for
oil-absorbent materials (e.g., straw) impregnated with the bacteria.'
The PTO, however, rejected ten claims drawn to the bacteria them-
1. Application for patent serial No. 260,563, dated June 7, 1962, was assigned to
General Electric Company, the real party in interest. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct.
2204, 2205 (1980). See also In re Bergy and In re Chakrabarty (Bergy I and Chakrabarty
I), 596 F.2d 952, 956 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct.
2204 (1980). The complete patent application is reproduced in the Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at 40-76.
2. Chakrabarty subsequently cancelled 17 of the 36 claims. Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at 78. Some of the remaining claims were modified to satisfy specific objections
raised by the patent examiner. Id. at 78-84.
3. The Supreme Court labeled Chakrabarty's invention as a live, human-made,
microorganism. 100 S. Ct. at 2205. In the words of the Court, Chakrabarty's "microorgan-
ism is the result of human ingenuity and research." Id at 2210. Chakrabarty used certain
genetic engineering techniques to alter the character of certain naturally occuring strains
of bacteria. See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 40. The term genetic engineering
applies to a growing number of techniques used to manipulate the structure of deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules within living cells. DNA molecules are the building-
blocks of the mechanisms by which a cell contains and conveys its genetic information.
See generally Boyer, The Age of Molecular Biology, 7 J. AM. PAT. L.A. 185 (1979).
4. Chakrabarty's bacteria are believed to have significant value in the control and
treatment of oil spills on water. 100 S. Ct. at 2206. The microorganisms have been described
as "superbugs [with] a gluttonous appetite for oil ... a corps of ultrasmall scavengers that
may one day devour oil spills." 150 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 374 (1976).
5. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 87-88. The patent application contains a
detailed description of the genetic engineering techniques employed to produce the micro-
organisms. Id. at 45-71.
6. Id. at 88. In his application, Chakrabarty stated that an inoculum (mass of
microbes) of genetically engineered bacteria will be dispersed on an oil spill from above to
effect biological control of the spill. However, no patent claims were drawn to this tech-
nique.
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selves,7 asserting that bacteria are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. §
101.8
Chakrabarty appealed to the PTO Board of Appeals (Board), which
found that the examiner had rejected the ten claims because the claimed
bacteria are products of nature, and because living things are not
patentable subject matter as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101.' The Board
concluded that the bacteria were not naturally occurring, and thus not
products of nature, but it upheld the examiner's rejection of the ten
disputed claims on the ground that Congress did not intend 35 U.S.C. §
101 to cover living things such as laboratory-created microorganisms."
Chakrabarty challenged the Board's ruling in the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (Patent Court).1 His appeal was heard two months
after the Patent Court decided In re Bergy," an unrelated case involv-
ing the patentability of live bacteria. In Bergy the court held that
microorganisms are patentable subject matter because they are within
the terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" in 35 U.S.C. §
101." The Patent Court followed its decision in Bergy and reversed the
Board's rejection of Chakrabarty's ten disputed claims." Approximately
two months after the Patent Court's decision in Chakrabarty, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bergy, vacated the Patent Court's
7. Id. at 87.
8. Petition for Certiorari at 165a-167a. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) provides that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 6btain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id.
9. The opinion and decision of the Board of Appeals, dated May 20, 1976, is
reproduced in the Petition for Certiorari at 159a. The second ground for rejection is not
readily apparent in the examiner's final letter to Chakrabarty. See Petition for Certiorari
at 165a. When the Court of Patent and Customs Appeals decided Chakrabarty's second
appeal, see note 19 and accompanying text infra, it did not not find in the examiner's final
rejection any rejection other than the first ground. 596 F.2d at 971.
10. Petition for Certiorari at 159a-163a. The Board agreed that Chakrabarty's
genetically engineered bacteria are not naturally occurring. But it argued that a bacteria
modified by genetic engineering is analogous to a human being that has been modified
through an organ transplant procedure. Id. at 162a. The Board noted that a human being
with a transplanted heart or liver is also not naturally occurring. Id. at 163a.
11. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 n.3 (C.C.P.A.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801
(1978).
12. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902
(1978).
13. Id. at 1038. A claim of Bergy's patent application was drawn to a biologically pure
culture of a newly discovered, naturally occurring microorganism that is capable of pro-
ducing an antibiotic drug. Following the PTO's rejection of the microorganism as
nonstatutory subject matter, Bergy argued that a biologically pure culture of the bacteria
does not exist in nature, which makes it a "manufacture" under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 563
F.2d at 1033.
14. 571 F.2d at 43.
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judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
its decision in Parker v. Flook."1
The PTO sought Supreme Court review of Chakrabarty and also
asked the Patent Court to vacate its own judgment on the grounds
that Bergy was no longer a valid precedent."8 The Patent Court acted
first. It vacated Chakrabarty, restored both Bergy's and Chakrabarty's
appeals to its calendar, and ordered that they be reheard together."
The PTO's petition for certiorari in Chakrabarty was dismissed by the
Supreme Court upon the stipulation of the parties. 8
After reexamining both cases, the Patent Court found that Flook shed
no light on the issues involved. 9 The court handed down a combined
decision" in which it adhered to its earlier judgments and granted the
denied claims of both appellants." The Patent Court said that the sole
issue raised by the PTO in both cases was whether an otherwise pat-
entable invention is excluded from the categories of statutory subject
matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101 merely because it is alive.' The court found
no legal significance to the distinction that microorganisms are alive.2
It said that microorganisms should be treated no differently from
chemical compounds under section 101."
15. 438 U.S. 902 (1978). The Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978),
held that an algorithm-a procedure for solving a mathematical problem on a com-
puter-is not patentable, even though the inventor has applied it to a specific end use.
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Stevens stated that it is the Court's duty to construe
the patent statutes as they now read, in light of prior precedents. He warned that the
Court must proceed cautiously when asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly un-
foreseen by Congress. Justice Stevens said we should not expand patent rights by over-
ruling or modifying our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument
for expansion is based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language.
Id. at 595-96 (citing Deepsouth Packing v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972), which
construed 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1976)).
16. 596 F.2d at 957.
17. See id The Patent Court did not formally consolidate the two appeals, although
they were heard together and decided together. Id at 955.
18. Id. at 957.
19. Id. at 967.
20. Id. at 955. Three members of the five-judge court joined in the majority decision.
One judge filed a concurring opinion and one judge dissented.
21. Id at 987.
22. Id. at 956. As the court noted, the PTO did not reject Bergy's or Chakrabarty's
claims for failure to meet any of the basic statutory requirements for patentability, such
as utility, see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), novelty, see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976), and nonobvious-
ness, see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); or for failure to comply with any other statutory condi-
tion or requirement, such as adequacy of disclosure, see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). The
Supreme Court made a similar observation in its opinion. 100 S. Ct. at 2207 n.5.
23. 596 F.2d at 975. This echoes the original holding in Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1038,
which the Supreme Court cited in its Chakrabarty opinion. See 100 S. Ct. at 2206.
24. 596 F.2d at 975. The Patent Court suggested that Chakrabarty's modified
1981 339
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Once again, the PTO appealed to the Supreme Court.25 The Court
granted certiorari to review both Bergy II and Chakrabarty 11.2 Bergy
II, however, was dismissed as moot before the appeals were heard,'
leaving only Chakrabarty II for decision.' In a 5-4 decision," the
Supreme Court affirmed Chakrabarty II, and held that Chakrabarty's
microorganism is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.1o
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, said that the'appeal
posed the narrow statutory-interpretation question of whether a micro-
organism constitutes a "manufacture" or "composition of matter"
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101."' He set out to answer the ques-
tion by restating three canons of construction that the Court had used
in past interpretations of section 101. The first canon commands that
the starting point of statutory construction be the language of a
statute.2 The second requires that the words of a statute, unless other-
wise defined, will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contem-
porary, common meaning.' The third canon cautions the courts not to
read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which have not
been expressed by the legislature."
microorganisms are analogous in practical use to inanimate chemical compositions used by
industry. Id
25. See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 3.
26. 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
27. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). Bergy cancelled the disputed claim in his patent application
on December 19, 1979. See Motion to Dismiss and Vacate as to Respondents Malcolm E.
Bergy, et al., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
28. 100 S. Ct. at 2206.
29. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Brennan filed a dissent,
which was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell.
30. 100 S. Ct. at 2208.
31. Id. at 2207. Chief Justice Burger prefaced this statement with a brief review of
the constitutional underpinnings of the patent laws. He cited U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
which provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the Progess of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." He then explained that the patent
laws promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as
an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts. Id See Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
32. 100 S. Ct. at 2207 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
405 (1979), which construed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended
1978)).
33. 100 S. Ct. at 2207 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979), which
construed the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976)).
34. 100 S. Ct. at 2207 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
199 (1933), which held that the U.S. government was not the equitable owner of a patent
on an invention developed by two government employees who were acting outside the
scope of their on-the-job duties).
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Guided by these canons, the Chief Justice explained, the Court has
construed "manufacture" in accordance with its dictionary definition,'
and "composition of matter" in accordance with its common usage.'
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that when Congress chose such expan-
sive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of matter," modified by
the comprehensive "any," it plainly contemplated that the patent laws
would be given wide scope.37 He concluded that the relevant legislative
history reflects congressional intent that statutory subject matter "in-
clude anything under the sun that is made by man.""
The Court cautioned, however, that 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not em-
brace every discovery. 39 The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable. 0 The Court held that, judged in this
light, Chakrabarty's microorganism plainly qualifies as patentable sub-
ject matter. His claim is not to hitherto unknown natural phenomenon,
but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of mat-
ter-a product of human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, charac-
ter, [and] use."'41 The Court distinguished Chakrabarty's appeal from
35. "Manufacture" has been defined as the production of articles for use from raw
materials prepared by giving to those materials new forms, qualities, properties, or com-
binations whether by hand labor or machinery. American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex,
283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (impregnating the rind of an orange to inhibit mold growth does not
make the treated orange a "manufacture" under the patent laws).
36. "Composition of matter" has been defined as two or more substances and ... all
composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mix-
ture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or solids. Shell Development Co. v. Wat-
son, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (publishing a
chemical structure diagram of an undeveloped organic chemical is anticipation that bars a
patent on the chemical when it is actually produced).
37. 100 S. Ct. at 2207.
38. Id The Committee Reports accompanying the recodification of the patent laws in
1952 state: "A person may have 'invented' a machine or a manufacture, which may include
anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under
section 101 unless the conditions of the title [Title 35] are fulfilled." S. REP. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2394, 2399.
39. 100 S. Ct. at 2208.
40. Id. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (an algorithm for program-
ming a computer to convert binary-coded decimal numbers into binary numbers is not
patentable); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948), see note 42 and ac-
companying text infra; O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853) (upholding
telegraph patents, but rejecting a broad claim to "every improvement where the motive
power is the electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing [of] in-
telligible characters . . . at a distance"); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175
(1852) (inventor of novel method of making lead pipe must claim the production method
itself as novel, rather than the application of a newly discovered scientific principle).
41. 100 S. Ct. at 2208 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887), which
held that treatment of decorative sea shells with acid or other means to prepare them for.
sale does not make them a "manufacture" under the patent laws).
1981
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the facts in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Co.,42 where an inventor
had sought to patent a mixed culture of naturally occurring bacteria.
His claims were denied on the theory that the inventor had discovered
"only some handiwork of nature."4 Chakrabarty, by contrast, produced
a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature."
Chief Justice Burger dismissed two contrary arguments advanced
by the PTO. The PTO first argued that the Plant Patent Act of 1930"
and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 19708 are evidence of congres-
sional understanding that 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not encompass living
things, 7 because if live subject matter is patentable under section 101,
both statutes are unnecessary. 8 The Court rejected this assertion, ex-
plaining that prior to 1930, plants were not given patent protection for
two reasons: First, plants, even if artificially bred, were considered to
be products of nature. Second, plants were thought not amenable to
the "written description" requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.11
The Chief Justice said that Congress addressed both of these con-
cerns when it enacted the Plant Patent Act of 1930, a statute that
gave patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants. 0 He
42. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). In Funk Bros. Seed Co. an i-nventor obtained a patent on a
mixed culture of naturally occurring root nodule bacteria that would induce nitrogen fix-
ing on clover, alfalfa, and soy bean plants, but would not inhibit each other when used
together. The Supreme Court overturned the patent, finding that the bacteria perform in
their natural way. Their use in combination does not improve in any way their natural
function. Thus, they serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite indepen-
dently of any effort of the patentee. Id. at 131.
43. Id.
44. 100 S. Ct. at 2208.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976) provides in relevant part that "[w]hoever invents or
discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including
cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propa-
gated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor ..
Id.
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976) provides in relevant part that "[t]he breeder of any novel
variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation
hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, or his successor in interest, shall be entitled
to plant variety protection therefor... :' Id.
47. 100 S. Ct. at 2208.
48. Id. at 2209.
49. Id. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) provides in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out his invention.
Id.
50. 100 S. Ct. at 2209. See note 45 supra.
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noted that nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress
believed that the terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" ex-
clude living things." According to the Court, Congress recognized that
the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things,
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-
made inventions.2
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 extended patent protec-
tion to sexually reproduced plants not encompassed by the earlier
statute.53 The Court noted that nothing in the statute's language or
history suggests that it was enacted because 35 U.S.C. § 101 did not in-
clude living things. 4 Chief Justice Burger also found no support for the
PTO's position in Congress' unexplained exclusion of bacteria from the
1970 statute.5 He concluded that absent some clear indication that
Congress focused on issues related to those before the Court,' there is
no basis for reading into its actions an intent to modify the plain mean-
ing of the words found in section 101.1
The second argument advanced by the PTO was that microorgan-
isms cannot be patentable subject matter until Congress expressly
51. 100 S. Ct. at 2209. See S. REP. No. 317, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1930), and H.R.
REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1930). The Chief Justice noted, however, that a
conclusory statement in a letter written by Secretary of Agriculture Hyde did support
the PTO's position. 100 S. Ct. at 2209. The Chief Justice maintained that the Secretary's
views were not entitled to controlling weight, because they were beyond the scope of his
competence. Id
52. 100 S. Ct. at 2210.
53. Id. See note 46 supra.
54. 100 S. Ct. at 2210.
55. Id. The Court accepted as a possible explanation for the exclusion of bacteria a
theory advanced by the Patent Court in Bergy II and Chakrabarty II that the exclusion
represented congressional agreement with In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940),
which held that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 encompassed only those items understood to
be plants by laymen. Thus, bacteria are not protected. See 596 F.2d at 984. The Chief
Justice also observed that prior to 1970, the PTO had in fact issued patents on bacteria
under § 101. 100 S. Ct. at 2210 n.9. This point was urged by the Patent Court in
Chakrabarty II, 596 F.2d at 985-86, and by Chakrabarty in the Supreme Court, Brief for
the Respondent at 18-25. The PTO objected vigorously to this argument. See Reply Brief
for the Petitoner. The PTO admitted that at least 17 patents may have been drawn to liv-
ing organisms. It asserted, however, that this "handful" of patents was issued without
review by the Board of Appeals or the Commissioner, thus making these patents "par-
ticularly poor proof of agency practice." Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 3 & n.2.
56. 100 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 120-121 (1978), which con-
strued the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(k), 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976)).
57. 100 S. Ct. at 2210, citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-93 (1978) (Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976) (amended 1979), precluded the TVA from com-
pleting the partially built Tellico dam across the Little Tennessee River because the dam
might cause the extinction of a species of fish).
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authorizes such protection.' The PTO argued that the technology of
genetic engineering was unforeseen by Congress when it enacted 35
U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, Congress, not the courts, must resolve the ques-
tion of patentability after weighing the competing economic, social, and
scientific issues.59 Chief Justice Burger disagreed. He explained that
Congress performed its constitutional role by defining patentable sub-
ject matter in section 101,' while the Supreme court performs its role
by construing the language Congress has employed. The Court is obliged
to take statutes as it finds them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by their
legislative history and statutory purpose." The Chief Justice concluded
that the patent laws are not ambiguous, but have been cast in broad
terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting "the
Progess of Science and useful Arts."62
The Chief Justice found nothing in Flook to the contrary. The Court
in Flook scrutinized a patent claim to determine if it was barred by
the underlying prohibition against patents for ideas or phenomena of
nature. 3 The Chief Justice maintained that the decision did not an-
nounce a new principle that inventions in areas not comtemplated by
Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per
se." He said that a rule holding unforeseen inventions unpatentable
would conflict with the core concept of the patent law that anticipation
undermines patentability. 5 Congress employed broad, general lan-
guage in drafting section 101 precisely because inventions that push
back the frontiers of science are often unforeseeable.6
To strengthen its position, the PTO warned of the possible risks of
58. 100 S. Ct. at 2210.
59. Id. The PTO invoked a statement in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 596, that the
judiciary must proceed cautiously when asked to extend patent rights to areas wholly un-
foresedn by Congress. 100 S. Ct. at 2210. See note 15 supra.
60. 100 S. Ct. at 2210-11. The Chief Justice prefaced his statement by noting that
Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of patentability. But, he added, once Con-
gress has spoken it is "the provence and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." Id. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
61. 100 S. Ct. at 2211.
62. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
63. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See note 15 supra.
64. 100 S. Ct. at 2211.
65. Id The Chief Justice noted that the Supreme Court has often observed that a
statute is not to be confined to particular applications contemplated by the legislatures.
rd (citing Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945), which construed the Tariff Act of
1930, § 522, 31 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1976)).
66. 100 S. Ct. at 2211. The Chief Justice obser;red that the inventions most benefit-
ting mankind are those that push back the frontiers of science. Id. (citing Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (a patent will not be granted on a trifling invention)).
Vol. 19:337
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genetic engineering research."' Although acknowledging the force and
passion of these arguments, the Chief Justice refused to consider
them." He maintained that the denial of patents on microorganisms is
not likely to deter future genetic engineering research. Much work has
been done to date without the sure knowledge that patent protection
would be available. 9 Chief Justice Burger also noted that the choice of
whether a potentially hazardous invention should be patentable is a
matter of high policy that must be resolved by the legislature after in-
vestigation, examination, and study.0
Congress is free, the Chief Justice concluded, to exclude genetically
engineered microorganisms from patent protection, as it has excluded
inventions related to nuclear weapons technology.71 But until Congress
acts, the language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 fairly embraces Chakrabarty's in-
vention.72
Justice Brennan dissented, 3 and rejected the contention that Con-
gress intended bacteria to be patentable. He maintained that the 1930
and 1970 plant patent statutes' demonstrate that Congress purpose-
67. 100 S. Ct. at 2211. The PTO's position was strongly supported by an amicus brief
filed on behalf of the People's Business Commission. The brief speaks almost totally to
issues of risk and social policy. See Brief on Behalf of the People's Business Commission,
Amicus Curiae at 5-6. Jeremy Rifldn, director of the association, has subsequently stated:
[I]n 10 or 20 years, Diamond fv. Chakrabarty] will be looked back on as the biggest
decision a court has ever made. [It is] the patent decision of the century because it
is the biggest opening. It says that any item manufactured by humans that per-
forms a function is patentable; in other words, that anything is patentable.
Patent Decision Fuels Genetic Research Debate, 66 A.B.A.J. at 943 (1980). See note 91
and accompanying text infra.
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2211.
69. Id. at 2211-12.
70. Id. at 2212. The Chief Justice observed that the courts should not appraise the
wisdom or unwisdom of a statute when construing it. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194
(1978); note 57 supra.
71. 100 S. Ct. at 2212. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1976) provides that: "No patent shall
hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utiliza-
tion of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon. Any patent
granted for any such invention or discovery is revoked, and just compensation shall be
made therefor." Id.
72. 100 S. Ct. at 2212.
73. Justices White, Marshall, and Powell joined in the dissenting opinion.
74. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 45-46 and accompanying
text supra. Justice Brennan prefaced his dissent by noting that the patent laws attempt
to reconcile this nation's deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage
progress. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) (expansion
of the patent privilege by the courts must be based on more than mere inference from
ambiguous statutory language; the courts require a clear and certain signal from Congress
before acting). Justice Brennan maintained that the courts should leave to Congress the
decision of whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into areas where the com-
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fully addressed the general problem of patenting animate inventions,
but give no affirmative indication of congressional intent that bacteria
be patentable. 5 Justice Brennan argued against the extension of the
"patent monopoly" in the face of uncertainty as to congressional
intent." He insisted that the caveat in FlookT was pertinent here,
because the need for caution becomes much greater when the Court is
asked to extend patent rights into areas Congress has foreseen and
considered but not resolved.78
Justice Brennan also refrained the PTO's argument that both plant
patent statutes are unnecessary if 35 U.S.C. § 101, which encompasses
the sweeping language of the Patent Act of 1793,"9 includes newly
developed living organisms that are not naturally occurring. He ob-
served that the plants covered by the plant patent statutes, and the
bacteria involved in this case, are both new varieties, not naturally oc-
curring. He refused to believe that Congress engaged in idle exercises
when it enacted the 1930 and 1970 statutes, or that it was concerned
with solving the technical problem of description." The expansive prose
in the congressional committee reports, he argued, is evidence that
Congress thought it was providing previously unavailable benefits.81
He reasoned that because Congress thought it necessary to enact
limited legislation to make human-made agricultural inventions patent-
able, it never intended for living organisms outside the scope of these
statutes to be patentable.82
mon understanding has been that patents are not available. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
75. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 & n.2. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. 1&
77. 437 U.S. at 596. See note 15 supra.
78. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793 provided in relevant part:
That when any person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of the United
States, shall allege that he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any
art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the
application ... it shall and may be lawful for the . . . Secretary of State, to cause
letters patent to be made out . . . thereupon granting to such petitioner, or peti-
tioners ... for a term not exceeding fourteen years, the full and exclusive right and
liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, the said in-
vention or discovery. ...
Patent Act of 1793, ch. XI, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
80. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By "technical problems," Justice Bren-
nan meant the reasons given in the majority opinion to explain why plants were not ac-
corded patent protection prior to 1930. Id at 2213 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See S. REP. No. 317, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8
(1930), and H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1930).
82. 100 S. Ct. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan also noted that Congress included bacteria within
the focus of its legislative concern when it specifically excluded
bacteria from the coverage of the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.
In his view, Congress assumed that animate objects could not be
patented unless covered by specific legislation. Based on this assump-
tion, Congress excluded bacteria from the set of patentable
organisms. '
Diamond v. Chakrabarty is one of a small group of modern Supreme
Court decisions8 that construes the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although
the case raised an issue of first impression in the Supreme Court," the
granting of Chakrabarty's ten disputed claims does not represent a
dramatic expansion of patentable subject matter under section 101. As
the Court noted, the PTO has occasionally issued patents on living
microorganisms. 8
The most significant aspect of Chakrabarty may well be the Court's
implicit holding that the broad language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 should be
read to define the outer boundaries of patentable inventions, rather
than to provide a list of patentable items. The Court observed that 35
U.S.C. § 101 was drawn in broad terms to encompass unforeseeable in-
ventions.87 But it refused to fit "microorganism" into any one broadly
interpreted category of "manufacture" or "composition of matter." It
held, instead, that the language of section 101 "fairly embraces" a live,
human-made microorganism.88
Chakrabarty can be read as Supreme Court authority for the propo-
sition that "anything under the sun that is made by man" is patentable
subject matter if not specifically excluded by Congress." This is an ap-
parent departure from the orthodox strict-construction view, a view
echoed in Justice Brennan's dissent, that the patent monopoly can only
83. Id.
84. The following Supreme Court opinions have construed 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) since
its enactment in 1952: Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978) (construing the term
"process"), see note 15 supra; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974)
("the subject matter of a patent is limited to a 'process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or . . . improvements thereof'"); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 &
n.2 (1972) (construing the term "process"), see note 40 supra; Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519, 529 & n.14 (1967) (construing the utility provision); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (construing the novelty and utility provisions).
85. Although the Supreme Court did not denote the case as one of first impression,
the lack of applicable precedent indicates that it is. The Patent Court expressly stated
that Bergy II and Chakrabarty H were cases of first impression. 596 F.2d at 955.
86. 100 S. Ct. at 2210 n.9. See note 55 supra.
87. 100 S. Ct. at 2211. The Patent Court made a similar ,argument in Chakrabarty II.
596 F.2d at 974.
88. 100 S. Ct. at 2212.
89. See text accompanying notes 38 & 72 supra.
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be granted to inventions included within the specific statutory subjects
and classes set forth in the patent laws." Chakrabarty thus seems to
transform section 101 into a preamble to the patent laws that makes
any invention short of a law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or an
abstract idea patentable if it meets the other statutory requirements.
It is difficult to conceive of any "thing" or "act" that will not fit within
a loosely construed 35 U.S.C. § 1011
A caveat, however, is necessary. Early in Chakrabarty, the Court
expressed its intention to determine whether a microorganism con-
stitutes a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the mean-
ing of 35 U.S.C. § 101.92 This implies a strict-construction approach that
does not comport with the eventual holding. Later on, the majority
used authority in its statutory interpretation analysis that also sup-
ports a strict reading of section 101. Chief Justice Burger cited
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co."' and Shell Development
Co. v. Watson" as illustrative of how the canons of statutory inter-
pretation he presented have been used to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101.11
Both of the cases seem to support a strict, rather than broad, construc-
tion of section 101.
The Brogdex Court invoked a dictionary definition of "manufac-
ture"-an article prepared by giving "raw . . . materials new forms,
qualities, properties, or combinations whether by hand-labor or by
machinery"-to determine if an orange treated with borax to retard
mold formation can be considered a "manufacture." The Court held
that the treated orange did not fit the dictionary definition of
"manufacture," and rejected the patent claim. 7 The Brogdex Court
90. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One treatise on patent law states:
In view of the fact that patent grants are authorized by statute ... only those
subjects or classes of inventions which are specifically enumerated by the patent
statutes can be given patent protection. Patentable subject matter ... embraces
certain classes of inventions, including processes, machines, manufactures, composi-
tions of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof.
A. DELLER, 1 WALKER ON PATENTS § 14 (1964) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
WALKER]. The PTO invoked this rule when it dealt with Chakrabarty's initial patent ap-
plication, thereby rejecting the 10 disputed claims as not within the classes of subject
matter patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
91. The Court cautioned that 35 U.S.C § 101 (1976) does not embrace all new
discoveries. 100 S. Ct. at 2208. However, its enumerated list of non-patentable discoveries
does not include any tangible "things." Id. See note 67 supra.
92. 100 S. Ct. at 2207.
93. 283 U.S. 1 (1931). See note 35 supra.
94. 149 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See note 36
supra.
95. 100 S. Ct. 2207.
96. 283 U.S. at 11.
97. Id.
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made no attempt to construe section 101 broadly.
Although Watson did not involve a 35 U.S.C. § 101 question, the
court defined "composition of matter" in the first paragraph of its opin-
ion to establish that the chemical compound involved in the litigation
fit squarely within one of the section 101 categories. The Watson court
used a patent treatise's definition of "composition of matter" as "all
compositions of two or more substances and ... all composite articles,
whether they be results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or
whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or solids."98 The treatise text
preceding the definition explains that the "class [composition of mat-
ter] is a very broad one and embraces chemical compounds, mechanical
or physical mixtures, alloys, and a great variety of things."" Applica-
tion of ejusdem generis"' to this list suggests that the treatise authors
intended their definition to encompass only conventional chemical and
metallurgical "compositions of matter." Thus, the Chakrabarty Court
incorrectly read Watson as providing a broad definition of "composi-
tion of matter."
Chief Justice Burger's use of Brogdex and Watson to support the
majority holding in Chakrabarty thus displays a tension between the
orthodox and liberal constructions of 35 U.S.C. § 101 that may require
resolution in future patent litigation. In a practical sense, however, the
decision is a sound accomodation of the patent laws to the realities of
modern technology. Genetic engineering is a rapidly emerging tech-
nology of manufacture;' °' its products have application in health care,
agriculture, pollution control, and alternative fuel production.
Chakrabarty's invention deserved the patent protection it received.
Ronald M. Benrey
98. 149 F. Supp. at 280. See WALKER, supra note 90 § 18.
99. WALKER, supra note 90 § 18.
100. Ejusdem generis, a rule of construction, requires that words associated together
in a phrase or sentence take "color" from each other. Thus, words of general meaning are
limited by the specific words they follow or are associated with. See Gooch v. United
States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936).
101. See generally Gilbert & Villa-Komaroff, Useful Proteins from Recombinant
Bacteria, SCIENTiFic AM., April 1980, at 74.
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